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Scenes of Truth 
Aldo Gargani 
Willard Van Orman Quine's efforts, begun in the fifties, to 
overcome the dualism between analytic and synthetic judgments 
have had a devastating and irreversible effect on epistemology of 
both the phenomenalistic and the physicalistic [fisicalistico] kind. 
The epistemology of logical positivism assumed that scientific and, 
therefore, meaningful and cognitive propositions were translata-
ble, without residue, into statements which referred to sense data 
-that is to assertions which contain the entry of the pure state 
of perceptual data. If, however, a statement cannot be true on 
the basis of its own meaning, then this thesis would imply, as 
Quine demonstrated, a vicious circle between the synonymy and 
the analyticity of linguistic expressions such that reference is in-
scrutable and translation is no longer a procedure that is operable 
on the basis of a firm logico-epistemological foundation. Thus, 
now we no longer have available a handbook for the translation. 
Following the irreversible turn accomplished by Quine, a ten-
dency enveloped post-neopositivistic-analytic epistemology which 
-starting from the impossibility of carrying out operations of logi-
cally based translation and reduction-rejected the idea of the 
corroboration of theories in terms of a verification carried out 
statement by statement. Rejected also was the idea of singling out 
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objects, whatever their nature might be, to which the statements 
would refer, since every theory is underpinned by its own refer-
ents. Besides, a theorem of the theory of models is that, given a 
class of true statements for any world whatsoever-that is, for 
our real world as for all possible worlds-this class is susceptible 
to a variety, almost an infinity of interpretations within a logically 
normalized notation. The road taken by epistemology and the 
philosophy of science, most noticeably in the sixties and seventies, 
was that of assuming a plurality of paradigms (Thomas Kuhn, 
Norwood Hanson), of "versions of the world" (Nelson Goodman), 
of conceptual schemes and criteria of rational decidability (Hilary 
Putnam)-according to which experience could be elaborated in 
such a way that empirical contents could be organized. 
This had been the general strategy of the culture of paradigms 
in Kuhn and Hanson, or of the doctrine of the versions of the 
world in Goodman, and finally of the epistemology of "internal 
realism" in Putnam's Reason, Truth, and History. This is fundamen-
tally the strategy employed by the more influential exponents of 
analytic philosophy (and epistemology) in the sixties and seventies, 
albeit according to different inclinations, directions, and options. 
But the story of this analytic commerce [traffico] did not end; 
for new problems and new questions are emerging today which 
are no less great and decisive than those which dictated the neces-
sity of the great labor of adjusting and rectifying the neopositivist, 
phenomenalistic, and physicalistic epistemology that we have 
spoken about. If, indeed, as it has been observed, 1 the Quineian 
criticism of phenomenalistic or physicalistic reductionism and of 
the dichotomy between analytic judgments and synthetic judg-
ments has had the effect of putting in crisis the "two dogmas" 
which belong to the tradition of empiricism, then now the substitute 
notion of the conceptual schemes of a reality or an uninterpreted 
experience seems to introduce what could be called the third dogma 
of empiricism-that of a neutral experience-one which is not inter-
preted and would subsist beyond all the conceptual schemes or all 
the versions of the world. It is said: we do not have an objective 
world; we do not have an experience in itself; available to us are 
paradigms alone-conceptual schemes or versions of that experi-
ence. We have in play here certain crucial philosophical points 
which decide, in my judgment, the very destiny of contemporary 
epistemology. 
First of all, if it is true that we do not have experience or the 
world at our disposition, but only schemes or versions of experi-
ence, then we are lacking the base itself, the standard for saying 
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that the conceptual schemes are schemes different from some thing. 
Likewise, we are much less qualified to affirm that human beings 
have the same conceptual scheme or the same ontology in com-
mon. If there is no intelligible grasp of that by means of which the 
schemes are different or identical, then there is no sense in speaking 
of a multiplicity, a diversity, or an identity of conceptual schemes. 
A serious and responsible analysis of this situation begins by 
declaring out of bounds the problem of cultural relativism, con-
nected as it is to the doctrine of conceptual schemes. I want to 
say that the very idea of conceptual schemes shows a quite in-
voluntary and tacit metaphysical presupposition. Analogously, 
the idea that translation is in principle not operable is likewise a 
metaphysical myth, since by saying that translation is impossible, 
we would have to have on hand an intelligible base, a standard 
or a criterion with respect to which we could measure the intrinsic 
fallibility of translation. The fact is, however, that we deal only 
with translations. But precisely because we do not have a logico-
epistemo-logical foundation of translation, we cannot say that a 
translation is guaranteed, nor can we say that it is impossible. All 
we can do is compare translations with other translations accord-
ing to a principle of interpretive charity referring to linguistic 
usages and to systems of belief, assumptions, and values which 
have sustained the transmitted texts of the tradition and the ex-
pressions that other speakers proffer. 
Let us now consider an influential feature of the notion of 
truth. The notion of truth-whatever its versions may have been, 
such as the classical version of the correspondence between language 
or representation and facts, or as the coherence of a statement with 
a body or system of transmitted statements, or yet as empirical 
corroboration pursuable according to the alternative strategies of 
verification or falsification-has been the theme of the great 
philosophic commerce which has always tried to explain it, to define 
it, or to construct it according to rules or criteria that in every case 
were a surplus to the specific concrete statements which were 
declared to be true. It is as if, in a certain sense, philosphers up 
to now had created a gap or had drawn a line between the state-
ments declared or held to be true on one hand and a rule normative 
for truth on the other, taken as the correct conduct for truth even 
before we come across a true statement. 
For example, philosophers have said that "true" is [means] 
what corresponds to a fact or what is comparable to a sense datum 
[data di senso, Erlebniss] or what is conformed to an actual or present 
experience . Now it is in the very act of posing these definitions 
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that all the problems and misunderstandings about the conduct 
to be assumed toward the concept of truth lurk. That a statement 
correspond or conform to a fact or to a perceptive datum-this 
does not clarify in the least the notion of truth as such . 2 More 
specifically, if we speak of truth as the compliance [adeguamento] 
of a statement to a fact or to a sensation or to a physical structure, 
I am not explaining-by means of reference to this entity-the 
notion of truth; rather, I am indicating the field, the aspect with 
which truth is concerned. By dragging out facts, sensations, the 
states of affairs , I do not add an additional factor, a new entity to 
the universe we know by sanctioning the legitimacy of a proposi-
tion in order to say that it is true. 
Here again we have in play an effect of duplication that has 
often been put into operation in philosophy and even in the epis-
temology of mathematics, in the sense that the notion of class or 
of number was taken and subsequently described or defined as 
a finite or infinite class; and respectively as a natural number or 
as a rational number and therefore real, etc., with the tacit assump-
tion that we are always dealing with the same entity which sus-
tained this succession of characterizations and specializations, 
while we know that the algebraic number is not a mere extension of 
the natural number, and that a class of elements, howsoever finite, 
belongs to a regimen of definitions and logical principles which 
are different from that which is concerned with an infinite class . 
The intrigue and equivocity of this game of philosophical 
prestige which externalizes itself in the duplication consists in a 
strategy which-starting from the meaning of a statement or from 
a true statement-duplicates the factors by introducing a sort of 
distance between the statement and its meaning, between the 
statement and its truth conditions . It is as if in these cases 
philosophical analysis pounced upon a meaningful statement or 
upon a meaningful and true statement to remove its condition of 
significance or of truth and then to resume its journey, with this 
booty among its provisions, so as to define a procedure of legitimi-
zation and of founding, destined to prescribe the meaning and 
truth conditions, respectively, of those statements. This may be 
a way of doing philosophy, as it has often been-based upon theft . 
It is in the divorce that philosophy and epistemology have 
perpetrated between the statement and its conditions of truth and 
meaning-subjected to an independent and preliminary treatment 
which would be its hunting grounds-that philosophy has opened 
up and defined its own field of inquiry, finding at the same time 
in this field the destiny of its own drama and its own impos-
sibilities. Philosophy performs upon the contents it investigates 
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a series of cuts that are its object of inquiry and at the same time the 
wound of an unhealable laceration. To this regimen of duplications 
-that philosophy initiates by simultaneously excavating the abysses 
into which it sinks-belong the classical dichotomies: fact and prop-
osition, analytic judgments and synthetic judgments, and the 
latest conceptual schemes and versions of the world on one hand 
and the uninterpreted empirical contents on the other. Much of 
analytic philosophy and epistemology has had a good time in 
widening these cuts which were the effects of duplications estab-
lished to produce foundational theories, but it did not succeed in 
healing and stitching the lips of the wounds that they had widened. 
If a philosophical gesture slices the truth of a factual statement 
into the condition of stated meaning on one hand and into sensa-
tion, empirical content, or state of affairs which would be its 
conditions of truth on the other, that gesture finds itself in the 
impossible situation of trying to put these two conditions back 
together again. In other words, to determine or to found the truth 
by making it consist in the contrast or in the tally of these condi-
tions, philosophy, in reality, constructs the very impossibility of 
their reconciliation. Such an impossibility is documented by the 
neopositivistic principle, according to which the sense and the 
truth of a statement consist in the method of its verification; or 
by the principle of phenomenalistic or physicalistic epistemology, 
according to which the sense and the truth of a statement consist 
in their accord with a perceptive datum. 
Why, indeed, as we have already noted, should the truth be 
made intelligible by the circumstance that a statement adapt itself 
or is conformed to a fact, to a state of affairs, or to an impression? 
What makes the statement "The table is green" true is not an 
empirical fact but the fact that the statement "The table is green" 
is true, i.e., that it is translatable into the language that we share 
and live. But having arrived at this point, it is altogether misleading 
to speak of facts, seeing that facts are not the data with which to 
compare propositions but that facts are the very statements of the 
language that we know and into which we translate those expres-
sions which can furnish us with our best insights about the notion 
of truth. We can say that the paths of truth are the very same 
paths of translation. The language that we know and in which 
we operate opens onto a horizon of truth, the horizon of proposi-
tions held to be true with respect to which we proceed with our 
jobs of translation. Beliefs and meanings of the statements hearken 
to this primordial horizon of truth. 
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We have to be there already-among true propositions. We 
cannot arrive, so to speak, from the outside. We cannot stand, as 
philosophers have sometimes held, outside of the truth and every 
now and then extend a hand to it, or arrive at it from the outside 
with a vehicle. We have to find ourselves already in the truth, 
i.e., in a horizon of true propositions in order to proceed to other 
true propositions. And this transition provides the commerce [traf-
fico] of translation, i.e., from true propositions to other true prop-
ositions. A horizon of truth in which we are historically immersed 
constitutes the influential scene, i.e., of the ensemble of statements 
held true from which we proceed toward other truths, i.e., toward 
other meanings and beliefs. 
The term "horizon" serves to designate precisely that condi-
tion through which it is not possible primordially to advance the 
idea of truth as the tallying of a statement with a fact, a state of 
affairs, or a sense impression. 
Why, indeed, as we have noted, should the truth be made 
intelligible by the circumstance that it is adapted or conformed to 
a fact? How could I say that a statement is true because it corre-
sponds to a fact if I did not already have the notion of a factually true 
statement, which I then proceeded in philosophical work to sepa-
rate into the notion of "true" and the notion of "fact" and finally 
in the presumed recomposition of their contrast? We deal with true 
statements, but not with things, facts, sensations that would render these 
statements true. If we wish to talk about facts, the only facts that we 
can legitimately evoke are the true propositions themselves. But 
it is at this point that it is no longer of any use to talk about facts 
or sense impressions or worlds that would make the propositions 
true because their (very) mention would be ultimately misleading. 
Instead of trying to establish the truth conditions of statements 
by resorting to facts, sense impressions, states of affairs, and 
fictitious and magical relations such that the former dwell upon 
the latter, we must renounce the producing of foundations of 
impossil:>le contrasts and comparisons and pass resolutely to a 
description of truth as a regimen of linguistic translations. This is 
to complete the passage toward the situation in which the truth 
is the putting to work of a procedure of translating statements. 
We have as many truths as there are translations we succeed in 
producing. We ought, then, to direct the notion of truth not toward 
a domain of facts, states of affairs, or worlds that would legitimate 
statements, but toward a regimen of operations wherein translat-
ing and interpreting are done. What we meet then is a circle of 
statements which by being interpreted and translated imply the 
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awareness of the beliefs and intentions of those who have formu-
lated and proposed them-beliefs and intentions which are grasp-
able, however, solely in the statements to which they are consigned. 
To make or recognize the truth is to perform this operation of 
translating statements on the basis of beliefs and intentions which 
in their turn are incorporated into the language which constitutes 
the horizon of the influential scenes of truth belonging to our 
form of life. In substance, the acceptance of something as true, 
the decision that commits us to a statement and the sticking to it 
is the intransitive condition which is our point of departure. "In-
transitive" means here the decision not to presuppose the distinction 
of the status of the statement from its factors of truth-sense impressions, 
states of affairs, worlds-and then the possibility of their contrast and 
their comparison. 
I am immediately in the truth which I utter. I do not arrive 
from the outside. All the rest is the ramification of that first intrans-
itive act. Language is intransitive in such a way that one does not 
begin to speak but one speaks from within and immediately. The 
discrepancy between judgments-for example, taking one thing 
for another, a hand for a glove-provided that they do not depend 
upon anomalies or accidental fortuities---can be measured and 
analyzed through a labor of translation which runs down the 
statements and body of beliefs to what holds them together. We 
can do no more than this, but there is no more that can be done. 
The truth is a regimen that goes on to the extent to which the 
domain of translation goes on, from the contrast between proposi-
tions held to be true with other propositions held to be true . The 
relevant significance of the circumstance that the truth is measured 
by the contrast between propositions held to be true consists in 
the recognition that we cannot maneuver the notion by placing 
ourselves as philosophers in the moment that precedes the truth. It 
is by having pretended to grasp that moment-wherein one pre-
tends to glance at truth over one's shoulder-that philosophy has 
always recruited the destiny of its desperate attempts . 
Now we can draw the consequences of this rotation of the 
axis of our considerations. If the truth is a task and a prospective 
of translation, and if the propositions held true are an inextricable 
part of the horizon of the beliefs wherein we live; and if the 
acceptance of a proposition as true is the crucial notion that con-
stitutes an intransitive decision, there could be no recourse to a 
fact, to a state of affairs, which could invalidate the question 
whether the differences between the speakers of different lan-
guages depend upon the diversity of the beliefs or upon the diver-
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sity of the conceptual schemes, or upon the versions of the workaday 
world. When we meet persons or speakers who think differently 
from ourselves , we can have no recourse to a fact, to evidence, 
or to a criterion which could establish whether the difference 
between us resides in their conceptual schemes or in the as-
semblage of their beliefs instead. This all happens through the 
essential circumstance that we translate propositions, interpreting 
them in terms of other propositions independently of a criterion 
of reference to facts, states of affairs, or sense impressions of 
which the statements would amount to the conceptual schemes. 
We do not possess the possibility to compare our statements with 
the statements of those who think differently than we on the basis 
of the difference of the conceptual schemes of an uninterpreted 
reality or experience out there. The truths, therefore, remain rela-
tive to the natural languages which are the fluid in which we are 
immersed while we live. The certifying of truths consists in oper-
ations of translation and of continuous reciprocal adjustments of 
statements which incorporate beliefs and of beliefs which appear 
exclusively in the texture of the statements . But this is the entire 
effort of the exercise that we can exert on the notion of truth-a 
duty of translating statements which is not conducted on the basis 
of a standard or a criterion aimed at the approximation of an 
uninterpreted reality out there or at preconditions of a permanent 
transcendental kind, or yet, at the arrival of a truth as the ideal 
limit of the successive approximations made by human cognitive 
enterprises. We deal rather with the conduct of a translation prac-
ticed according to a principle of interpretive charity, 3 according 
to which statements related to beliefs are compared to other state-
ments immanent to beliefs. 
Consequently, the idea of the impossibility of translation or 
of its perfect fidelity are two equivalent metaphysical myths, in-
spired by the presupposition of an uninterpreted reality which 
human beings would model, as it comes upon conceptual 
schemes, or versions of the world. We know, however, that the 
idea of that impossibility as well as that of a guaranteed translation 
are both philosophical mythologies. We have in reality at our 
disposal only translations of statements. And the only thing we 
can do is compare translations on the basis of a principle of inter-
pretive charity . It is as if to say, which is to say it again, that we do 
not compare statements with facts, states of affairs, or impressions 
in order to make intelligible the notion of truth; that we travel, 
finally, and we are destined to travel in the translated of the 
translation. Is this idealism? Have we had a relapse into an 
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idealism brought up to date as linguistic idealism? On the contrary . 
For it was precisely the idea of versions of the world, and of con-
ceptual schemes that obstruct our access to the world . By means 
of the doctrines of conceptual schemes, of the versions of the 
world, we were exiled from the world. And it is precisely by liber-
ating ourselves from the idea of a conceptual scheme which masks 
an uninterpreted experience that we can approach the objects 
which surround us, as if they were old, rediscovered friends. A 
friend is someone we look at without the suspicion of a threatening 
reality lurking inside him or her. 
1. Cf. Donald Davidson, Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation (Oxford, 1985), 190. 
2. Davidson, 193-94. 
3. Cf. Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (Cambridge, 1981), 117; 
Davidson, 197. 
